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Abstract 
Security and privacy vulnerabilities in RFID authentication protocols may affect RFID users by revealing their identification 
information especially in Healthcare systems. Previous researches in RFID authentication protocols have mainly focused on 
authenticating the real tag’s secret key and identifier, which may help attackers directly obtain these important values. Therefore, 
in this paper, we present new initialization (IA) and termination (TA) stages of an RFID authentication protocol that improves the 
RFID security and privacy by authenticating the tag and the server without using the real tag’s values (secret key and identifier). 
If the tag and the server pass the initial stage of authentication (IA), Any authentication protocol can be applied to send and 
receive the real identification values between them. 
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1. Introduction 
Healthcare systems are continuously working on improving patients’ safety, nurses’ productivity and 
physicians’ administration. Precisely, identification is an important step in healthcare systems because each part of 
the healthcare system must be identified whether patients, devices or medications. Misidentification can cause fatal 
issues that can harm patients and affect a hospital’s budget. One type of errors identified by Benner’s group during 
nurses’ errors investigation was wrong medications being delivered because of misidentifying patients [1][2][3][4]. 
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In addition, nurses and physicians do not bear the responsibility alone for this error; healthcare systems must also be 
responsible. Using advanced technology such as Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) will reduce the 
misidentification issues in healthcare systems [5][6]. The use of RFID is growing rapidly in healthcare systems and 
the market for RFID technology in healthcare systems is expected to grow from $90 million in 2006 to $2.1 billion 
in 2016 [7]. The reason why RFID has been adopted in healthcare systems is because the technology is affordable 
and has helped hospitals in reducing medication errors. The issue that can affect RFID systems in terms of 
identification is the authentication techniques between the RFID components. The authentication techniques issues 
may lead to misidentification if an attack occurs on the tag identities [8][9].  
RFID technology uses radio waves to transfer data and track any object that has a tag attached to it. The RFID 
system has three main components: the tag, the reader, and the back-end server. The tag is usually placed on objects 
and has identification values such as a secret key and an identifier stored in its memory. These values are also stored 
in the back-end server, and the tag can authenticate itself by sending and receiving its values to the server through a 
reader. The reader queries tags by sending radio frequency (RF) signals to ask the tags for their identification values 
in order to authenticate them [10][11].  
The authentication protocols between the tag and the back-end server are a crucial issue. The messages are 
transmitted through the air in RFID systems and those protocols are still directly using the real tags’ identity such as 
tag identifier and secret key in the authentication phase. For these reasons, RFID users can be affected by 
publicizing their RFID tags’ contents because any malicious RFID reader can track their location or distinguish their 
identification and private information. Solving RFID authentication issues will go a long way to persuade people 
that using these tags will not jeopardize their secret data [12][13][14]. Recent studies have focused on adding four 
methods that can improve the authentication protocols (using the real tag identity) such as timestamps, hash 
functions, Bitwise XOR operation, and Pseudo random number generator (PRNG)[15]. These methods have 
improved some security and privacy issues such as tag anonymity and traceability, de-synchronization attacks, 
impersonation attacks, replay and parallel attacks, denial of service attacks (DoS), backward and forward 
traceability, man-in-the-middle attacks, and cloning attacks. Although these privacy and security issues are 
improved, the real tags’ identities are still directly used in the authentication phase, which may make the 
authentication processes vulnerable [14].  
In this paper, we present two RFID authentication stages, which are initialization (IA) and termination (TA) 
stages that will improve RFID security and privacy by authenticating the tag and server without using the tags’ real 
values (secret key and identifier). The IA stage technique makes the decision earlier whether to accept or abort the 
authentication session. After the tag and the server successfully pass the IA stage, we can use any authentication 
protocol (proposed by previous studies) to send and receive the tag’s identification values. The TA stage is proposed 
to guarantee that the server knows about the status of the tag’s authenticity and updating. We believe that adding the 
IA and TA stages between the server and the tag will improve RFID security and privacy authentication protocols.  
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, we review the Kaul and Awasthi scheme. Section 3 
presents the proposed protocol. Section 4 analyses the proposed protocol’s security and privacy, and concluding 
remarks are given in section 5. 
2. Review of Kaul and Awasthi [16] Scheme 
In this proposal, we use Kaul and Awasthi’s protocol [16] along with the two proposed stages as an example of 
the previous authentication protocols. Notice that any other protocol can be applied, as long as we have the two 
stages of authentication proposed in this paper. Kaul and Awasthi [16] proposed an authentication protocol to 
prevent tag traceability by updating the tag’s secret key (ki) and identifier (tidi) between the tag and the server. They 
used a one-way hash function, pseudo random number generator, and bit XOR operation to compute all of the 
operations in the protocol. Their protocol consists of three phases: the initialization phase, the authentication phase, 
and the updating phase. In the initialization phase, the tag identity and tag secret key (tidi,ki) are assigned by the 
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server and stored in the tag’s memory and in the database system. The reader has no knowledge of these data. 
Likewise, the server will store the new pair of tag identity and tag secret key (tidinew,kinew) in its database. In the 
authentication phase, a pseudo random number r1 is sent to the tag from the reader. Next, the tag will generate r2 and 
compute the messages A1 and A2; A1 = h(ki ⊕  r1) ⊕  r2 and A2 = h(tidi || r1 || r2 || ki || T). The tag will send the 
message A1, A2, and T (current time of the tag) to the reader in order to resend it to the server. When the reader 
receives the message (A1, A2, T), it will check the timestamp by comparing the current time of the reader (T’) with 
the tag’s time (T’ - T) ≤ &T; where &T is the expected time interval for transmission delay. If the authentication 
request is accepted, the reader will change the time of the message to the reader’s time and send the message (A1, 
A2, T’) to the server; otherwise, the reader will reject the authentication request. Similarly, the server will verify the 
timestamp with the current time of the server (T’’ – T’) ≤ &T. If the authentication request is accepted, the server 
will look for r2* in order to compute A2* and comparing A2* with A2 received from the tag, r2*= A1 ⊕  h(ki ⊕  r1) 
and A2* = h(tidi || r1 || r2* || ki || T’’); otherwise, the server will reject the authentication request.  
After authenticating the tag in the server, the server will compute and send A3 = h(tidi ⊕  r1 ⊕  r2 ⊕  ki) to the 
tag through the reader. The reader will directly send it to the tag, after which the tag will compute A3* = h(tidi ⊕  r1 
⊕  r2 ⊕  ki) and compare it with the A3 message to complete the mutual authentication. In the updating phase, the tag 
will update tidi and ki and replace them with the new tag identifier and secret key, tidinew = (tidi ⊕  r1 ⊕  r2) and kinew = 
h(ki || r1 || r2). On the other hand, the server will not replace them, but will keep the old and the new tag identifiers 
and secret keys until the synchronized authentication is accomplished. 
3. The proposed protocol 
The proposed protocol has the following phases: 
3.1 Initialization Phase. 
3.2 Authentication Phase. 
3.2.1 Initialization of Authentication Stage (IA). 
3.2.2 Kaul and Awasthi’s [16] protocol (or any previous studies). 
3.2.3 Termination of Authentication (TA). 
3.3 Updating Phase. 
 
The following notations are used in the proposed protocol: 
    Table 1: Notations and symbols 
Notations and Symbols 
tidi           Tag Identifier 
ki             Tag’s Secret Key 
si              Tag Secret Value 
tidinew       New Tag Identifier 
kinew         New Tag Secret Key 
sinew         New Tag Secret Value 
r1,r2         Pseudo Random Numbers 
&T          Expected Transmission Delay 
Ttag          Current Time in the Tag 
Treader       Current Time in the Reader 
Tserver       Current Time in the Server 
h()           Hash Function 
⊕             Bitwise XOR Operation 
||              Concatenation Operation 
 
3.1 Initialization Phase 
 
The initialization phase will be similar to that in [16], except the si value (a temporary random number) will be 
added in both the tag and the server. The server will assign and store the tag identifier, tag secret key, and secret 
value si (tidi , ki , si) in both the tag memory and the server database and each of these values is a sequence of 64 or 
96 bits long. We assume that the reader is registered in the server and they can communicate through secure wired 
channels. 
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3.2 Authentication Phase 
 
To avoid using the real tag’s values, such as secret key and identifier, proposed messages are added between the 
tag and the server to authenticate the secret value si shared between them. This will help to add a level of 
authentication prior to messages being exchanged. In other words, only tags that have the proper si value can 
complete the authentication process. Figure 1 illustrates the following stages.  
 
Server (tidi, ki, si)(tidinew, kinew, sinew)  Reader    Tag (tidi, ki, si) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.2.1 Initialization stage of authentication 
 
Step 1: Reader  Tag 
The reader generates a random number r1 and sends it to the tag.  
 
Step 2: Tag  Reader 
In this step, we use a simple hash function along with the secret value si [17]. The tag will generate r2, and the 
two random numbers r1 and r2 will be together in a message called x =(r1||r2). The x message will be concatenated 
with si value (x || si), after which we use the hash function, such that h(x || si). Next, the tag will compute y = si ⊕ r2 
and then send h(x || si) and y with the current time of the tag (h(x || si), y, Ttag) to the reader. After sending the 
message, the tag will wait for the hello message to start the following process of authentication with the real tag’s 
Generate r1 
(1) r1 Generate r2 
(2) (h(x || si), y, Ttag) 
Verify (Treader - Ttag) <= &T 
(3) (r1, h(x || si), y, Treader) 
(4) Verify (Tserver – Treader) <= &T 
r2*= y ⊕ si 
Verify x || si 
h(x || si) 
Compare h(x || si) = h(x || si) ?? 
Yes, send hello message 
No, abort 
   hello  hello 
A1 = h(ki ⊕ r1) ⊕ r2 
A2 = h(tidi || r1 || r2 || ki) 
(5) (A1, A2, Ttag) 
Verify (Treader – Ttag) <= &T 
(6) (r1, A1, A2, Treader) 
(7) Verify (Tserver – Treader) <= &T 
r2*= A1 ⊕ h(ki ⊕ r1) 
A2*= h(tidi || r1 || r2* || ki) 
Compare A2* = A2 ?? 
Compute A3 
A3= h(tidi ⊕ r1 ⊕ r2 ⊕ ki) 
(A3, Tserver) Verify (Treader – Tserver) <= &T 
(8) A3 
A3*= h(tidi ⊕ r1 ⊕ r2 ⊕ ki) 
A3*= A3 
(9) (h(x || si), Ttag) 
Update Phase 
Verify (Treader – Ttag) <= &T 
(10) (h(x || si), Treader) 
(11) Verify (Tserver – Treader) <= &T 
Compare h(x || si) = h(x || si) ?? 
Yes, update phase 
No, abort 
Secure Channel Insecure Channel 
Figure1: The proposed protocol 
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secret key and identifiers. 
 
Step 3: Reader  Server 
After getting the tag response, the reader will verify the time of the message by comparing the current time of 
the reader (Treader) with the tag’s time (Treader - Ttag) ≤ &T. If the message is accepted, the reader will add r1 and 
change the time of the message to the reader’s time and send the message (r1, h(x || si), y, Treader) to the server. 
 
Step 4: Server 
After getting the message from the reader, the server will verify the time of the message by comparing the 
current time of the server (Tserver) with the reader’s time (Tserver – Treader) ≤ &T. If the message is accepted, the server 
will look for r2* by computing r2*= y ⊕ si. Next, the server will verify this message (h(x || si), y, Treader) in a series of 
three steps. Firstly, the server will extract and store h(x || si) from the received message. Secondly, the server will 
concatenate the x = (r1||r2*) message with si value of the tag stored in the server and use the hash function on them. 
Lastly, the server will compare the hashed message computed in the server with the hash message computed in the 
tag, and if they are equal, the server will send a hello message to start the following process of authentication. If they 
are not equal, the server will abort the session. 
3.2.2 Kaul and Awasthi’s [16] protocol 
 
Step 5 – Step 8:  
As we explained previously, any protocol can be used in this stage. We used Kaul and Awasthi’s proposed 
protocol as example to illustrate the proposed protocol’s processes in details. In step 7, the r2* does not need to be 
computed again because it is computed in step 4 and stored in the server.  
3.2.3 Termination stage of authentication 
 
Step 9: Tag  Reader 
The main idea of resending a hashed message in this step is to guarantee that the server is aware of the status of 
the tag – namely, whether the message A3 was accepted and its values updated, or the message A3 did not reach the 
tag. If the server receives this message, it means that the tag is now authentic and its values are updated; otherwise, 
the server will not update its values and will instead abort. Thus, when the tag accept the message A3, it sends this 
message (h(x || si), Ttag) to the server and moves to the update phase; otherwise, it aborts. 
 
Step 10: Reader  Server 
The reader verifies the time of the message and passes it to the server. 
 
Step 11: Server 
The server verifies the time of the message. If the message is accepted, the server verifies this message (h(x || 
si), Treader). If the server accepts the message, the server will move to the update phase; otherwise, it will abort. 
 
3.3 Updating Phase 
 
The tag updates tidi, ki and si value, and then replaces them with tidinew, kinew, and sinew; tidinew = h(tidi), kinew = 
h(ki), and sinew = h(si). Similarly, the server will replace the old values only if the server receives the last hashed 
message from the tag in (TA) indicating that the tag has received the A3 message; otherwise, the server will abort. 
     Table 2: The Updating phase 
 Server Tag 
 tidinew = h(tidi) 
 tidi  tidinew 
 kinew = h(ki) 
ki  kinew 
sinew = h(si) 
si  sinew 
 tidinew = h(tidi) 
tidi  tidinew 
kinew = h(ki) 
ki  kinew  
 
sinew = h(si) 
si  sinew  
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4. Security and Privacy analysis of the proposed protocol 
4.1. Achieve Mutual Authentication 
A mutual authentication is guaranteed by verifying the secret shared si value between the tag and the server in 
IA, and acknowledging that the tag has received the last message sent from the server in TA. We have assumed that 
the communication between the reader and the server is secured. Also, the proposed scheme ensures that the reader 
is authentic because the reader must be registered in the server. Thus, since all eligible readers are registered in the 
server, a fake reader will be detected. The tag will start the authentication process whenever it received a challenge 
from the reader. In addition, the timestamps will be used in each step to guarantee that the authentication processes 
occur all in the same session.  
4.2. Tag Anonymity and Untraceability  
Using updated random numbers in each authentication request between the reader and the tag will guarantee 
tag anonymity and untraceability. Moreover, when the tag sends the last hashed message (TA stage) to notify the 
server about its authenticity, the server and tag will replace all of the tag’s values, which will keep the tag 
anonymous and untraceable. In addition, timestamps are still used in each message to check if the messages are also 
in the same session. All of the tag’s values will be unique in each session and replaced after each successful session, 
which provides a high level of privacy. 
4.3. De-synchronization Attack Resistance 
De-synchronization is prevented in our scheme because the last hashed message (TA stage) will inform the 
server of the A3 message’s status. If the tag sends back a hashed message indicating that it has received the A3 
message from the server, the server and tag will be able to update the values. However, if the tag does not send back 
a hashed message, the server will understand that there has been a de-synchronization attack, in which case the 
server will not update the tag’s values because the tag did not update its values and thus is not authentic. For this 
reason, adding the TA stage and replacing the server’s and tag’s old values with new values will guarantee de-
synchronization resistance because the tag and the server will either be updated together or aborted together. 
4.4. Impersonation Attack Resistance 
The proposed scheme will be able to prevent a tag impersonation attack because all of the tag’s values will be 
hashed and XORed in the IA and TA stages. Also, using updated random numbers for each tag reading will help 
resist an attack. At the same time, a server impersonation attack will be prevented because we assumed that the 
communication between the server and the reader occurs through a secure channel. 
4.5. Replay and Parallel Session Attack 
An attacker cannot perform a replay and parallel session attack because the IA and TA stages update the shared 
secret value si and random numbers in each tag reading. Using the IA stage will help to stop the session in earlier 
stage before the attacker can get into the real tag’s values in the subsequent phase. When the tag sends the last 
hashed message (TA stage) to the server, all of the tag’s values will be replaced, which will also prevent such an 
attack. Moreover, timestamps and the RFID authentication stages are applied in each session to guarantee that the 
messages are sent between the authentic tag and server. 
4.6. Denial of Service Attack (DoS) 
The protocol will deny such an attack because the tag and server will communicate with a shared si value for 
each tag and updated random numbers. If ambiguous messages were sent to the server, the server would abort the 
session. However, if the server does not receive the message in the IA stage, the tag will detect that the server is not 
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synchronized because the server did not reply with a “hello” message. The server and the tag will not continue in 
this ambiguous session and will stop communicating. In this case, the tag must only receive a random number for 
each tag reading and a hello message after the server accepts the shared si value. If the tag receives anything other 
than that, the tag will detect that there is a problem. Also, all of the messages are monitored by a timestamp in each 
sent message to guarantee that the messages will only be sent and received between the recognized tag and server. In 
addition, the reader verifies the received messages’ timestamps. If the timestamps are related to the same session, 
the reader resends these messages; or otherwise aborts.   
4.7. Backward and Forward Traceability 
The proposed protocol resists backward and forward tractability because the IA stage uses updated si values 
and random numbers in each session. Moreover, because all of the hashed values are approved at the server side, an 
attacker that wants to perform backward traceability needs to break the IA stage first and then break the subsequent 
stages of authentication to get to the server. In addition, the old values of the tag and the server are replaced with the 
new values in the updating phase, which helps the server to prevent any unknown values and forward traceability. 
4.8. Man-in-the-Middle Attack 
When the tag and the server authenticate each other in the IA stage, an attacker cannot modify the messages 
because all next processes will be performed and controlled by two authenticated parties (tag and server), and these 
two parties will update the si value and the random numbers in each tag reading. Since the tag is authenticated in the 
IA stage, the attacker cannot have any action until the session is completed. Also, using a hash function on the 
messages ensures a high level of security. 
4.9. Cloning Attack 
As long as the tag has si secret value shared with the server, no attacker can fake the tag. If an attacker attempts 
to send a corrupt query to get the tag’s si value and succeeds in doing so, the server will detect the problem in the 
subsequent stage of authentication and abort the session because the attacker does not have the real tag’s secret key 
and identifier. Also, the si value and random numbers shared between the tag and the server will be updated. 
5. Conclusion 
In this paper, we presented new IA and TA stages of the RFID authentication protocol that did not use a real 
tag’s values (secret key and identifier). The presented protocol initialized a new si value for the tag and server to be 
checked whenever a tag reading occurs. After that, any protocol (proposed in previous studies) that used a real tag’s 
values can be applied as a second stage of RFID authentication. Lastly, in the TA stage, the tag informed the server 
whether the authentication processes were achieved to replace all of the tag’s values, or to abort. These two stages 
can improve patients’ security and privacy in healthcare systems because they only use updated random numbers 
without using real tag’s values that can identify patients’ information. Thus, patients’ identities are secure and 
private unless the attackers directly attack the real tag’s values. For future work, we will implement and analyze our 
proposed protocol with [16] using Scyther tool, Cryptool tool, and java in order to investigate the differences 
between them in terms of messages’ communications and cryptography. 
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